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Abstract
We propose analyzing conditional reasoning by
appeal to a notion of intervention on a simula-
tion program, formalizing and subsuming a num-
ber of approaches to conditional thinking in the
recent AI literature. Our main results include
a series of axiomatizations, allowing comparison
between this framework and existing frameworks
(normality-orderingmodels, causal structural equa-
tion models), and a complexity result establishing
NP-completeness of the satisfiability problem. Per-
haps surprisingly, some of the basic logical princi-
ples common to all existing approaches are invali-
dated in our causal simulation approach. We sug-
gest that this additional flexibility is important in
modeling some intuitive examples.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Much of intelligent action and reasoning involves assessing
what would occur (or would have occurred) under various
non-actual conditions. Such hypothetical and counterfactual
(broadly, subjunctive) conditionals are bound up with central
topics in artificial intelligence, including prediction, expla-
nation, causal reasoning, and decision making. It is thus for
good reason that AI researchers have focused a great deal of
attention on conditional reasoning (see, e.g., [Ginsberg, 1986;
Delgrande, 1998; Friedman et al., 2000; Pearl, 2009;
Bottou et al., 2013], among many others).
Two broad approaches to subjunctive conditionals have
been especially salient in the literature. The first, originating
in philosophy [Stalnaker, 1968; Lewis, 1973], takes as basic
a “similarity” or “normality” ordering on possibilities, and
evaluates a claim ‘if ϕ then ψ’ by asking whether ψ is true
in (e.g., all) the most normal ϕ possibilities. The second
approach, associated with the work of Judea Pearl, takes as
basic a causal “structural equation” model (SEM), and eval-
uates conditionals according to a defined notion of interven-
tion on the model. These two approaches are in some techni-
cal and conceptual respects compatible [Pearl, 2009], though
∗In Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2018).
they can also be shown to conflict on some basic logical mat-
ters [Halpern, 2013]. Both capture important intuitions about
conditional reasoning, and both have enjoyed successful ap-
plications in AI research.
In this article we propose a third approach to condition-
als, which captures a different intuition, and which can al-
ready be seen as implicit in a growing body of work in
AI, as well as in cognitive science. This approach takes
as basic the notion of a simulation model, that is, a pro-
gram for simulating the transformation from one state of
the world to another, or for building up or generating a
world from a partial description of it. Simulation mod-
els have been of interest since the earliest days of AI
[Newell and Simon, 1961]. A recent tradition, coming out
of work on statistical relational models, has proposed build-
ing complex generative models using rich and expressive
programming languages, typically also incorporating prob-
ability (e.g., [Pfeffer and Koller, 2000; Milch et al., 2005;
Goodman et al., 2008; de Raedt and Kimmig, 2015]). Such
languages have also been used for modeling human reason-
ing, including with counterfactuals [Goodman et al., 2015].
Simulation models have an obvious causal (and more gen-
eral dependence) structure, and it is natural to link condition-
als with this very structure. We can assess a claim ‘if ϕ then
ψ’ by intervening on the program to ensure that ϕ holds true
throughout the simulation, and asking whether ψ holds upon
termination. This is conceptually different from the role of
intervention in structural equation models, where the post-
intervention operation is to find solutions to the manipulated
system of equations. As we shall see, this conceptual differ-
ence has fundamental logical ramifications.
This more procedural way of thinking about subjunc-
tive conditionals enjoys various advantages. First, there
is empirical evidence suggesting that human causal and
conditional reasoning is closely tied to mental simulation
[Sloman, 2005]. Second, there are many independent reasons
to build generative models in AI (e.g., minimizing prediction
error in classification; see [Liang and Jordan, 2008]), making
them a common tool. Thus, opportunistically, we can expect
to have suchmodels readily available (perhaps unlike normal-
ity orderings or even structural equation models).
Related to this second point, many of the generativemodels
that are currently being built using deep neural networks fit
neatly into our approach, even though we can often only use
them as black boxes (see, e.g., [Mirza and Osindero, 2014;
Kocaoglu et al., 2017], etc.). We know how to intervene on
these programs (i.e., controlling input), and how to read off a
result or prediction—that is, we can observe what conditional
claims they embody—even though we may not understand all
the causal details of the learnedmodel. Some authors have re-
cently argued that certain kinds of counterfactual analysis in
particular establish an appropriate standard for interpretabil-
ity for these models [Wachter et al., 2018].
Our contribution in this article is threefold: (1) we propose
a general semantic analysis of conditional claims in terms of
program executions, subsuming all the aforementioned appli-
cation areas; (2) we establish completeness theorems for a
propositional conditional language with respect to (four dif-
ferent classes of) programs, allowing a comparison with al-
ternative approaches at a fundamental logical level; (3) we
establish NP-completeness of the satisfiability problem for
these logical systems. Before turning to these details, we ex-
plain informally what is distinctive about the resulting logic.
2 Conditional Logics
The literature on conditional logic is extensive. We focus here
on the most notable differences between the systems below
and more familiar systems based on either world-orderings or
SEMs. We will be using a notation inspired by dynamic logic
(also used by [Halpern, 2000]), whereby [α]β can loosely be
read as, ‘if α were true, then β would be true.’ Understand-
ing the complete logic of a given interpretation can be of both
theoretical and practical interest. In the causal setting, for
instance, a complete set of axioms may give the exact condi-
tions under which some counterfactual quantity is (not) iden-
tifiable from statistical data [Pearl, 2009].
One of the bedrock principles of conditional reasoning is
called Cautious Monotonicity [Kraus et al., 1990], or some-
times the Composition rule [Pearl, 2009]. This says that
from [A](B ∧ C) we may always infer [A ∧ B]C. While
there are known counterexamples to it in the literature—it
fails for some probabilistic and possibilistic interpretations
[Dubois and Prade, 1991] and in standard versions of default
logic [Makinson, 1994]—the principle is foundational to both
world-ordering models and SEMs. By contrast, in our set-
ting, holding B fixed during the simulation may interrupt the
sequence of steps leading to C being made true. Here is a
simple example (taken from [Icard, 2017]):
Example 1. If Alf were ever in trouble (A), the neighbors
Bea and Cam would both like to help (B andC, respectively).
But neither wants to help if the other is already helping. Imag-
ine the following scenario: upon finding out that Alf is in
trouble, each looks to see if the other is already there to help.
If not, then each begins to prepare to help, eventually making
their way to Alf but never stopping again to see if the other
is doing the same. If instead, e.g., Cam initially sees Bea al-
ready going to help, Cam will not go. One might then argue
that the following both truly describe the situation: ‘If Alf
were in trouble, Bea and Cam would both go to help’ and ‘If
Alf were in trouble and Bea were going to help, Cam would
not go to help’.
The example trades on a temporal ambiguity about when
Bea is going to help, and it can be blocked simply by time-
indexing variables. However, following a common stance in
the literature [Halpern, 2000; Pearl, 2009], we maintain that
requiring temporal information always be made explicit is ex-
cessively stringent. Furthermore, in line with our earlier re-
marks about black box models, we may often be in a situation
where we simply do not understand the internal temporal and
causal structure of the program. To take a simple example,
asking a generative imagemodel to produce a cityscapemight
result in images with clouds and blue skies, even though a re-
quest to produce a cityscape with a blue sky might not result
in any clouds. We would like a framework that can accom-
modate conditional theories embodied in artifacts like these.
Our completeness results below (Thm. 1) show that
the logic of conditional simulation is strictly weaker than
any logic of structural equation models (as established in
[Halpern, 2000]) or of normality orderings (as, e.g., in
[Lewis, 1973]). The conditional logic of all programs is
very weak indeed. At the same time, some of the axioms
in these frameworks can be recovered by restricting the class
of programs (e.g., the principle of Conditional Excluded Mid-
dle, valid on structural equation models and on some world-
ordering models [Stalnaker, 1968], follows from optional ax-
iom F below). We view this additional flexibility as a feature.
However, even for a reader who is not convinced of this, we
submit that understanding the logic of this increasingly popu-
lar way of thinking about conditional information is valuable.
Prior Work. The notion of intervention introduced below
(Defn. 1) is different from, but inspired by, the correspond-
ing notion in SEMs [Meek and Glymour, 1994; Pearl, 2009].
The logical language we study in this paper, restricting
antecedents to conjunctive clauses but closing off under
Boolean connectives, follows [Halpern, 2000].
Interestingly, prior to any of this work,
[Balkenius and Ga¨rdenfors, 1991] studied conditionals
interpreted specifically over certain classes of neural net-
works, using a definition of “clamping a node” similar to our
notion of intervention. They also observed that some of the
core principles of non-monotonic logic fail for that setting.
(See in addition [Leitgeb, 2004] for further development of
related ideas.)
3 Syntax
Let X be a set of atoms X1, X2, X3, . . . and let Lprop be the
language of propositional formulas over atoms in X closed
under disjunction, conjunction, and negation. Let Lint ⊂
Lprop be the language of purely conjunctive, ordered formu-
las of unique literals, i.e., formulas of the form li1 ∧ . . .∧ lin ,
where ij < ij+1 and each lij is eitherXij or ¬Xij . Each for-
mula in Lint will specify an intervention by giving fixed val-
ues for a fixed list of variables. We also include the “empty”
intervention ⊤ in Lint. Given ϕ ∈ Lprop, ϕ
′ ∈ Lint is
the Lint-equivalent of ϕ if ϕ is a propositionally consistent,
purely conjunctive formula over literals and ϕ′ results from
a reordering of literals and deletion of repeated literals in
ϕ. For example, the Lint-equivalent of ¬X2 ∧ X1 ∧ X1 is
X1 ∧ ¬X2. Let Lcond be the language of formulas of the
form [α]β for α ∈ Lint, β ∈ Lprop. We call such a for-
mula a subjunctive conditional, and call α the antecedent and
β the consequent. The overall causal simulation language
L is the language of propositional formulas over atoms in
X ∪ Lcond closed under disjunction, conjunction, and nega-
tion. For α, β ∈ L, α → β abbreviates ¬α ∨ β, and α ↔ β
denotes (α→ β) ∧ (β → α). We use 〈α〉 for the dual of [α],
i.e., 〈α〉β abbreviates ¬[α](¬β).
4 Semantics
We now define the semantics of L over causal simulation
models. A causal simulation model is a pair (T,x) of a Tur-
ing machine T and tape contents represented by a state de-
scription x = {xn}n∈N, which specifies binary
1 values for all
tape variables, only finitely many of which can be nonzero.
Running T on input x yields a new state description x′ as
output, provided the execution halts. We say x |= Xi iff
xi = 1 in x. Satisfaction x |= ϕ of ϕ ∈ Lprop is then
defined in the familiar way by recursion. For X-atoms we
define (T,x) |= Xi iff x |= Xi. Toward a definition of satis-
faction for subjunctive conditionals, we now define an inter-
vention (in the same way as in [Icard, 2017]):
Definition 1 (Intervention). An intervention I is a com-
putable function mapping a machine T to a new machine
I(T) by taking a set of values {xi}i∈I , I ⊆ N a finite index
set, and holding fixed the value of each Xi to xi throughout
the execution of T. That is, I(T) first sets eachXi to xi, then
runs T while ignoring any write to anyXi.
Any α ∈ Lint uniquely specifies an intervention, which we
denote as Iα: each literal in α gives a tape variable to hold
fixed, and the literal’s polarity tells us to which value it is to
be fixed. Now we define (T,x) |= [α]β iff for all halting
executions of Iα(T) on x, the resulting tape satisfies β. Note
that for deterministic machines, this means either Iα(T) does
not halt on x, or the unique resulting tape satisfies β. The
definition also implies that (T,x) |= 〈α〉β iff there exists
a halting execution of Iα(T) on x whose result satisfies β.
Having now defined (T,x) |= ϕ for atoms ϕ ∈ X ∪ Lcond,
(T,x) |= ϕ for complex ϕ ∈ L is defined by recursion.
Interestingly, as revealed by Prop. 1, model checking in
this setting is difficult, while satisfiability (or validity) for no-
table classes of machines is decidable (Thm. 2).
Proposition 1. If α ∧ β is propositionally consistent, then it
is undecidable whether (T,x) |= 〈α〉β.
Proof Sketch. Under a suitable encoding of natural numbers
on the variable tape, the class Tα = {Iα(T) : T ∈ T },
where T is the class of all machines, gives an enumerable
list of all the partial recursive functions, with T computably
recoverable from T′ ∈ Tα. Moreover, Hβ = {T ∈ Tα :
T halts on input x with output x′ |= β} is extensional and
∅ ( Hβ ( Tα, so by the Rice-Myhill-Shapiro Theorem it is
undecidable. If we could decide whether (T,x) |= 〈α〉β, this
would allow us to decide whether T′ = Iα(T) ∈ Hβ .
A second limitative result is that we cannot have strong
completeness (that is, completeness relative to arbitrary sets
1The present setting can be easily generalized to the arbitrary dis-
crete setting, indeed without changing the logic. See [Icard, 2017].
of assumptions), since by Prop. 2 we do not have compact-
ness. On the other hand, our axiom systems (Defn. 3) are
weakly complete (complete relative to finite assumption sets).
Proposition 2. The language L interpreted over causal sim-
ulation models is not compact.
Proof. Let f : N → N be any uncomputable total function
such that f(n) 6= n for all n and consider Ω = {¬Xn :
n ∈ N} ∪ {〈Xn〉Xf(n) : n ∈ N} ∪ {[Xn]¬Xm : m,n ∈ N
with m 6= n,m 6= f(n)}. If (T,x) satisfies every ϕ ∈ Ω,
we could compute f(n) by intervening to set Xn to 1, and
checking which other variable Xm is set to 1. As f is total
and f(n) 6= n, we could always find such m = f(n). So Ω
is unsatisfiable. But it is easily seen that every finite subset of
Ω is satisfiable.
5 Axiomatic Systems
We will now identify axiomatic systems (Defn. 3) that are
sound and complete with respect to salient classes (Defn. 2)
of causal simulation models, by which we mean that they
prove all (completeness) and only (soundness) the generally
valid principles with respect to those classes.
Definition 2. Let M be the class of all causal simulation
models (T,x), where T may be non-deterministic. LetMdet
be the class of models with deterministic T, and let M↓ be
the class of models with non-deterministic T that halt on all
input tapes and interventions. Also letM↓det =Mdet ∩M
↓.
Definition 3. Below are two rules and four axioms.2
PC. Propositional calculus (over the atoms of L)
RW. From β → β′ infer [α]β → [α]β′
R. [α]α
K. [α](β → γ)→ ([α]β → [α]γ)
F. 〈α〉β → [α]β
D. [α]β → 〈α〉β
AX denotes the system containing axiomsR and K and closed
under PC and RW. AXdet is AX in addition to axiom F, AX
↓
is AX in addition to axiom D, and AX
↓
det is the system com-
bining all of these axioms and rules.
For the remainder of this article, fix M† to be one of the
classesM,Mdet,M
↓, orM↓det, and let AX
†
be the respec-
tive deductive system of Defn. 3. Then:
Theorem 1. AX
†
is sound and complete for validities with
respect to the classM†.
Proof. The soundness of PC, RW, R, and K is straightfor-
ward. IfM† isMdet (orM
↓
det), any M ∈ M
† has at most
one halting execution, so a property holding of one execution
holds of all and F is sound. IfM† isM↓ (orM↓det), then any
2 We use the standard names from modal and non-monotonic
logic. The Left Equivalence rule [Kraus et al., 1990], namely, in-
fer [α]β ↔ [α′]β from α ↔ α′, is not needed: since antecedents
belong to Lint, they are never distinguished beyond equivalence.
M has at least one halting execution, so a property holding of
all holds of one, and D is sound.
As for completeness, it suffices to show that any AX
†
-
consistent ϕ has a canonical model Mϕ ∈ M
† satisfying it.
Working toward the construction of Mϕ, we prove a normal
form result (Lem. 1) that elucidates what is required in order
to satisfy ϕ (Lem. 3). We then define simple programming
languages (Defn. 4)—easily seen to be translatable into Tur-
ing machine code—that we employ to construct a program
forMϕ that meets exactly these requirements.
Lemma 1. Any ϕ ∈ L is provably-in-AX (and -AX†) equiva-
lent to a disjunction of conjunctive clauses, where each clause
is of the form
pi ∧
∧
i∈I
(
[αi]
∨
j∈Ji
βj
)
∧
∧
k∈K
〈αk〉βk (1)
and pi ∈ Lprop while βj , βk ∈ Lint for all j ∈ Ji for all i ∈ I
and for all k ∈ K . We may assume without loss of generality
that αi 6= αi′ for distinct i, i
′ ∈ I .
Proof. Note that provably in AX, [α](β ∧ γ) ↔ [α]β ∧ [α]γ
and 〈α〉(β ∨ γ)↔ 〈α〉β ∨ 〈α〉γ. Use these equivalences and
PC and RW to rewrite and get the result.
Given a clause δ as in (1), let Sδ ⊂ Lint be the set ofLcond-
antecedents appearing in δ. Each δ gives rise to a selection
function fδ : Sδ → ℘(Lint) (cf. [Stalnaker, 1968]), obtained
(not uniquely) as follows. To give the value of fδ(α), suppose
that α = αk for some k ∈ K . If α = αi for some i ∈ I , then
α ∧ βk ∧
∨
j∈Ji
βj is consistent: otherwise, [α]
∨
j∈Ji
βj ∧
〈α〉βk implies 〈α〉⊥ which is AX- (and AX
†) inconsistent.
Thus for some j ∈ Ji, α ∧ βk ∧ βj is also consistent. In
general α may be αk for multiple k ∈ K . For each such
k, we find such a βj . We then set fδ(α) to the set of Lint-
equivalents of the α ∧ βk ∧ βj , and set fδ(α) to the set of
Lint-equivalents of the α ∧ βk, if α 6= αi for any i ∈ I . The
remaining case is that α ∈ Sδ but α 6= αk for any k ∈ K; in
this case, set fδ(α) = ∅.
Lemma 2. If AX
†
is AXdet or AX
↓
det we can assume fδ(α) is
a singleton (or possibly empty in the case of AXdet). If AX
†
is AX
↓
or AX
↓
det we can assume that ∅ /∈ range(fδ).
Proof. In AXdet, if 〈α〉β1 and 〈α〉β2, then because [α]β1 and
[α]β2, and thus [α](β1∧β2), we have 〈α〉(β1∧β2). In AX
↓
it
is always possible to assume that for each i ∈ I there is some
j ∈ Ji such that 〈αi〉βj appears as a conjunct. So no such αi
will be sent to ∅.
Lemma 3. Let δ be a disjunct as in (1). Let M ∈ M. Sup-
pose thatM |= pi, and for all α ∈ Sδ thatM |= 〈α〉β for each
β ∈ fδ(α), that M |= [α]
∨
β∈fδ(α)
β, and that M |= [α]⊥
whenever fδ(α) = ∅. ThenM |= δ.
Proof. We show that M satisfies every conjunct in (1); sat-
isfaction of pi is given. For conjuncts 〈αk〉βk, for k ∈ K ,
suppose first that αk 6= αi, for any i ∈ I . Then fδ(αk) =
{αk ∧ βk′ : k
′ ∈ K such that αk = αk′}. If M |=
〈αk〉(αk ∧ βk′) then M |= 〈αk′ 〉βk′ for all such k
′. Thus
suppose αk = αi for some i ∈ I . Again by the construction
of fδ, we have fδ(αk) = {αk ∧ βk′ ∧ βjk′ : k
′ ∈ K such that
αk = αk′} for some jk′ where each jk′ ∈ Ji. Then M |=
〈αk〉(αk∧βk′ ∧βjk′ ) impliesM |= 〈αk〉βk′ for each such k
′.
To see thatM |= [αi]
∨
j∈Ji
βj for each i such that αi = αk,
by the assumption, we haveM |= [αk]
∨
j∈J′i
(αk ∧ βk′ ∧ βj)
for some J ′i ⊆ Ji. Generalizing the disjunction to Ji and
distributing it through shows that M |= [αk]
∨
j∈Ji
βj . Fi-
nally, for conjuncts [αi]
∨
j∈Ji
βj where αi 6= αk for any
k ∈ K , we have fδ(αi) = ∅ so that M |= [αi]⊥. But then
M |= [αi]β for any β whatsoever, so that such conjuncts are
satisfied.
Definition 4. Let PL be a programming language whose pro-
grams are the instances of 〈prog〉 in the following grammar:
〈const〉 ::= ‘0’ | ‘1’ 〈var〉 ::= X1 |X2 | . . . |Xn | . . .
〈cond〉 ::= 〈var〉 ‘=’ 〈const〉 | 〈var〉 ‘=’ 〈var〉
| 〈var〉 ‘!=’ 〈var〉 | 〈cond〉 ‘&’ 〈cond〉
〈assign〉 ::= 〈var〉 ‘:=’ 〈const〉 | 〈var〉 ‘:=’ 〈var〉 | 〈var〉
‘:= !’ 〈var〉
〈branches〉 ::= 〈prog〉 | 〈branches〉 ‘or’ 〈branches〉
〈prog〉 ::= ‘’ | 〈assign〉 | 〈prog〉 ‘;’ 〈prog〉 | ‘loop’
| ‘if’ 〈cond〉 ‘then’ 〈prog〉 ‘else’ 〈prog〉 ‘end’
| ‘choose’ 〈branches〉 ‘end’
PLdet will denote the same language except that PLdet ex-
cludes choose-statements, PL↓ is identical but for exclud-
ing loop-statements, and PL
↓
det is identical but for excluding
both choose- and loop-statements.
A program in any of these languages may be “compiled”
to the right type of Turing machine in an obvious way (loop
represents an unconditional infinite loop). For the remain-
der of the article, fix PL† to be the programming language of
Defn. 4 corresponding to the choice ofM†.
With the normal form result and suitable languages in
hand, we proceed to construct the canonical model Mϕ =
(Tϕ,xϕ) for ϕ. Mϕ need only satisfy a consistent clause δ
as in (1). Intuitively, Mϕ will satisfy Lprop-atoms in δ via a
suitable tape state xϕ (existent as δ and a fortiori pi is consis-
tent), and will satisfy each Lcond-atom by dint of a branch in
Tϕ, conditional on the antecedent, in which the consequent is
made to hold. We now write the PL†-code of such a Tϕ.
Suppose we are given δ, and that for each α ∈ Sδ we have
code HoldsFromIntervention(α) defining a condition
that is met iff the program is currently being run under an in-
tervention that fixesα to be true. Then consider a PL-program
Pϕ that contains one if-statement for each α ∈ Sδ, each ex-
ecuting if HoldsFromIntervention(α) is met. In the
body of the if-statement for α, Pϕ has a choose-statement
with one branch for each β ∈ fδ(α). The branch for each β
consists of a sequence of assignment statements guaranteed to
make β hold, call this MakeHold(β), clearly existent since
each β is satisfiable. If fδ(α) is a singleton, this body contains
only MakeHold(β); if fδ(α) = ∅, then this body consists of
a single loop-statement. If Tϕ is the machine corresponding
to Pϕ, and xϕ is a tape state satisfying pi, then Mϕ |= 〈α〉β
for each β ∈ fδ(α), as the program has a halting branch with
MakeHold(β); also, Mϕ |= [α]
∨
β∈fδ(α)
β as there are no
other halting executions. If fδ(α) = ∅, then Mϕ |= [α]⊥,
since under an α-fixing intervention the program reaches a
loop-statement and has no halting executions. So by Lem.
3, we have that Mϕ satisfies δ. And thus ϕ. To see that
Mϕ ∈ M
†, apply Lem. 2: in AX
↓
, ∅ /∈ range(fδ) so we
have no loops in Pϕ and Mϕ ∈ M
↓. In AXdet, we have
no choose-statements, so Mϕ ∈ Mdet; in AX
↓
det, we have
neither loop- nor choose-statements, andMϕ ∈M
↓
det.
But how do we know it is possible to write code
HoldsFromIntervention(α) by which the program
can tell whether it is being run under an α-fixing interven-
tion? For any tape variable, we may try to toggle it. If
the attempt succeeds, then the variable is not presently fixed
by an intervention. If not, then the present execution is un-
der an intervention fixing the variable. Thus, we first try to
toggle each relevant variable. Let N be the maximum in-
dex i of any atom Xi appearing in ϕ. Listing 1—call it
IsIntervened(Xi)— performs the toggle check for Xi
and records the result inXi+N . It usesXi+2N as a temporary
variable and ultimately leaves the value ofXi unchanged.
Listing 1: IsIntervened(Xi)
Xi+N := Xi;
Xi := ! Xi;
Xi+2N := Xi;
if Xi+2N = Xi+N then Xi+N := 1
else Xi+N := 0 end;
Xi := ! Xi;
If IsIntervened(Xi) has already been run for all 1 ≤ i ≤
N , HoldsFromIntervention(α) simply checks that ex-
actly those variables appearing in α have been marked as in-
tervened on, and that these have the correct values. If α is the
Lint-equivalent of¬Xi1∧. . .∧¬Xik∧Xik+1∧. . .∧Xin , code
for HoldsFromIntervention(α) is given in Listing 2.
Listing 2: HoldsFromIntervention(α)
Xi1 = 0 & . . . & Xik = 0 &
Xik+1 = 1 & . . . & Xin = 1 &
Xi1+N = 1 & . . . & Xik+N = 1 &
Xik+1+N = 1 & . . . & Xin+N = 1
Completing the description of the code ofPϕ adumbrated ear-
lier, Pϕ consists of, in order:
1. One copy of IsIntervened(Xi) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
2. For each α ∈ Sδ , an if-statement with condition
HoldsFromIntervention(α), whose body is:
(a) a choose-statement with a branch for each β ∈
fδ(α), with body MakeHold(β), if |fδ(α)| ≥ 2;
(b) a MakeHold(β)-snippet, if |fδ(α)| = 1;
(c) or a single loop-statement if fδ(α) = ∅.
Note that Pϕ never reads or writes a variable Xi for i >
3N , and the relevant PL†-operations may be implemented
with bounded space, so that we have the following Corollary:
Corollary 1. Let M†,fin be the class of finite state machine
restrictions of M†, i.e. those (T,x) ∈ M† where T uses
only boundedly many tape variables, for any input and inter-
vention. Then Thm. 1 holds also forM†,fin.
6 Computational Complexity
In this section we consider the problem SIM-SAT(ϕ) of de-
ciding whether a given ϕ ∈ L is satisfiable inM†. Although
by Prop. 1, it is in general undecidable whether a given par-
ticular simulation model satisfies a formula, we show here
that it is decidable whether a given formula is satisfied by any
model. In fact, reasoning in this framework is no harder than
reasoning in propositional logic:
Theorem 2. SIM-SAT(ϕ) is NP-complete in |ϕ| (where |ϕ|
is defined standardly).
Proof. We clearly have NP-hardness as propositional satisfi-
ability can be embedded directly into L-satisfiability. To see
that satisfiability is NP, we guess a M and check whether
M |= ϕ. M† is infinite, and the checking step is undecid-
able by Prop. 1. So how could such an algorithm work? The
crucial insight is that we may limit our search to a finite class
M†ϕ of models that are similar to the canonicalMϕ (Lem. 5).
Moreover, a nice property of the canonicalTϕ is that it wears
its causal structure on its sleeves: one can read off the effect
of any intervention from the code of Pϕ, and Pϕ has poly-
nomial size in |ϕ| (implied by Lem. 4). Models inM†ϕ will
share this property, guaranteeing that the checking step can be
done in polynomial time. We will now makeM†ϕ precise and
prove these claims. Let Sϕ ⊂ Lint denote the set of Lcond-
antecedents appearing in ϕ. For C ∈ N, define PL†ϕ,C ⊂ PL
†
as the fragment of programs whose code consists of:
1. One copy of IsIntervened(Xi) (Listing 1), for each
1 ≤ i ≤ N , followed by
2. at most one copy of an if-statement with condition
HoldsFromIntervention(α) (Listing 2) for each
α ∈ Sϕ, whose body is one and only one of the follow-
ing options, (a)–(c):
(a) a choose-statement with at most C|ϕ| branches,
each of which has a body consisting of a single se-
quence of assignments, which may only be to vari-
ablesXi for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ;
(b) a single sequence of assignment statements, only to
variablesXi for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ;
(c) a single loop-statement.
However, if PL† = PLdet, (a) is not allowed; if PL
† =
PL
↓, (c) is not allowed; and if PL† = PL↓det, neither (a)
nor (c) is allowed.
Lemma 4. The maximum length (defined standardly) of a
program in PL
†
ϕ,C is polynomial in |ϕ|, and there is a C such
that for all ϕ, we have Pϕ ∈ PL
†
ϕ,C , assuming Pϕ exists.
Proof. N is O(|ϕ|), so part 1 of a program is O(|ϕ|) in
length. There are at most |Sϕ| if-statements in part 2; con-
sider the body of each one. In case (a) it hasO(|ϕ|) branches,
each of which involves assignment to at most N variables,
and thus has length O(|ϕ|2). In case (b) its length is O(|ϕ|);
in case (c) its length is O(1). Since |Sϕ| is O(|ϕ|), the to-
tal length of part 2 is O(|ϕ|3), so that both parts combined
are O(|ϕ|3). To show the existence of C, it suffices to prove:
any choose-statement in the body of an if-statement in Pϕ
has O(|ϕ|) branches. Now, the number of branches in the
if-statement for α is |fδ(α)|, for some consistent δ as in (1).
But (1) is a clause of the disjunctive normal form of ϕ and
contains no more L-literals than does ϕ, which is of course
O(|ϕ|). Since each element of fδ(α) arises from the selection
of a literal in (1), the number of branches is O(|ϕ|).
Henceforth let PL†ϕ denote PL
†
ϕ,C for some C guaranteed
by Lem. 4, and call the set of x where only tape variables
Xi with indices 1 ≤ i ≤ N are possibly nonzero XN . Let
M†ϕ be the class of models (T,x) where T comes from a
PL
†
ϕ-program and x ∈ XN . M
†
ϕ is finite, and the following
Lemma guarantees that we may restrict the search toM†ϕ:
Lemma 5. ϕ is satisfiable with respect toM† iff it is satisfi-
able with respect toM†ϕ.
Proof. If ϕ is satisfiable in M†, it is AX†-consistent by
soundness, and hence has a canonical (Tϕ,xϕ). Without loss
of generality take xϕ from Thm. 1 to be in XN . Then by
Lem. 4, (Tϕ,xϕ) ∈M
†
ϕ, so ϕ is satisfiable inM
†
ϕ.
Now with Lem. 5 our algorithm will guess a program
P ∈ PL†ϕ and a tape x ∈ XN , and verify whether the guessed
model M ∈ M†ϕ satisfies ϕ. We just need to show that
the verification step is decidable in polynomial time. Sup-
pose that all negations in ϕ appear only before L-atoms,
since any formula may be converted to such a form in linear
time. Further, rewrite literals of the form ¬[α]β to 〈α〉¬β.
Then it suffices to show that we can decide in polynomial
time whether M satisfies a given literal in ϕ: there are lin-
early many of these and the truth-value of ϕ may be evalu-
ated from their values in linear time. For an X-literal Xi or
¬Xi, we simply output whether or not x |= Xi. For Lcond-
literals with antecedent α, simulate execution of Iα(T) on
x. Because P ∈ PL†ϕ and such programs trigger at most
one HoldsFromIntervention(α) if-statement when
run under an intervention, we may perform this simulation
by checking if there is any if-statement for α in P. If so, do
one of the following, depending on what its body contains:
(a) If a choose-statement, simulate the result of running
each branch. Output true iff: either the literal was [α]β
and every resulting tape satisfies β, or the literal was
〈α〉β and at least one resulting tape satisfies β.
(b) If an assignment sequence, simulate running it on the
current tape, and output true iff the resulting tape satis-
fies β.
(c) If a loop, output true iff the literal is of the [α]β form.
This algorithm is correct since we thereby capture all halt-
ing executions, given that PL†ϕ-programs conform to the fixed
structure above. That it runs in polynomial time follows from
the polynomial-length bound of Lem. 4.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
A very natural way to assess a claim, ‘if α were true, then β
would be true,’ is to run a simulation in which α is assumed
to hold and determine whether β would then follow. Simu-
lations can be built using any number of tools: (probabilis-
tic) programming languages designed specifically for gener-
ative models, generative neural networks, and many others.
Our formulation of intervention on a simulation program is
intended to subsume all such applications where conditional
reasoning seems especially useful. We have shown that this
general way of interpreting conditional claims has its own
distinctive, and quite weak, logic. Due to the generality of
the approach, we can validate further familiar axioms by re-
stricting attention to smaller classes of programs (determinis-
tic, always-halting). We believe this work represents an im-
portant initial step in providing a foundation for conditional
reasoning in these increasingly common contexts.
To close, we would like to mention several notable future
directions. Perhaps the most obvious next step is to extend
our treatment to richer languages, and in particular to the first
order setting. This is pressing for several reasons. First,
much of the motivation for many of the generative frame-
works mentioned earlier was to go beyond the propositional
setting characteristic of traditional graphical models, for ex-
ample, to be able to handle unknown (numbers of) objects
(see [Poole, 2003; Milch et al., 2005]).
Second, much of the work in conditional logic in AI
has dealt adequately with the first order setting by using
frameworks based on normality orderings [Delgrande, 1998;
Friedman et al., 2000]. It is perhaps a strike against the
structural equation approach that no one has shown how
to extend it adequately to first order languages (though see
[Halpern, 2000] for partial suggestions). In the present set-
ting, just as we have used a tape data structure to encode a
propositional valuation, we could also use such data struc-
tures to encode first order models. The difficult question
then becomes how to understand complex (i.e., arbitrary first-
order) interventions. We have begun exploring this important
extension.
Given the centrality of probabilistic reasoning for many of
the aforementioned tools, it is important to consider the prob-
abilistic setting. Adding explicit probability operators in the
style of [Fagin et al., 1990] results in a very natural extension
of the system [Ibeling, 2018]. One could also use probability
thresholds (see, e.g, [Hawthorne and Makinson, 2007]): we
might say (T,x) |= [α]β just when Iα(T) results in output
satisfying β with at least some threshold probability.
Finally, another direction is to consider additional sub-
classes of programs, even for the basic propositional setting
we have studied here. For example, in some contexts it makes
sense to assume that variables are time-indexed and that no
variable depends on any variable at a later point in time (as
in dynamic Bayesian networks [Dean and Kanazawa, 1989]).
In this setting there are no cyclic dependencies, which means
we do not have programs like that in Example 1. Understand-
ing the logic of such classes would be worthwhile, especially
for further comparison with central classes of structural equa-
tion models (such as the “recursive” models of [Pearl, 2009]).
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